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Surprisingly, ethnic and other particularistic party bans have received little scholarly attention. The academic debate on Africa and other world regions has focused on other measures of party regulation and institutional engineering -electoral systems, party funding, federalism, and decentralisation -which are designed to accommodate intercommunal relations and contribute to the survival and consolidation of democracy.
To date there has been virtually no research on party bans in Africa, let alone their effects.
The project 'Managing Ethnic Conflict through Institutional Engineering. Ethnic Party Bans in Africa', funded by the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung, seeks to fill this gap through a study that addresses several relevant research questions, including the origins of party bans, their normative compatibility with democracy, and their actual impact. 1 This paper deals with what is possibly the most important aspect in terms of institutional engineering and embarks on a preliminary inquiry into the effects of implemented party bans in sub-Saharan
Africa. The central research problem is thus as follows: Is there any evidence that the implementation of ethnic and other particularistic party bans has an impact on conflict and democracy?
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section clarifies the concept of an ethnic ban, favouring the more abstract term 'particularistic party ban'. This is followed by a brief theoretical discussion about how particularistic party bans may affect levels and dynamics of democracy and intercommunal conflict. Based on this discussion, we develop a number of hypotheses. After presenting the database and outlining the methodology, the main section engages in a preliminary test of these hypotheses on the effects and discusses the results.
The final section draws a number of conclusions in terms of theoretical and methodological as well as practical aspects and highlights areas for future research.
Theoretical Framework: Potential Impact of Party Bans on Conflict and Democracy

Concept and Types of Ethnic and Particularistic Party Bans
Even a preliminary study of the impact of ethnic party bans requires a clear cut notion of the object under investigation. What do we understand by ethnic or particularistic party bans?
According to our understanding (see also Basedau/Bogaards/Hartmann/Niesen 2007; Becher 2008; Bogaards 2007: 179) an ethnic or particularistic party ban denotes a highly restrictive official legal sanction that aims at prohibiting the existence or activity of a political party which is composed of, seeks the support of, and acts on behalf or in the interest of a particular ethnic or particularistic identity group. In a broad sense (Jackson 1984) , ethnicity embraces all kinds of socially attributed identities such as clan, community, ethnicity, faith (religion), gender, language, regional provenance, race, sect or tribe, and the like, all of which 1 The project: 'Managing Ethnic Conflict through Institutional Engineering. Ethnic Party Bans in Africa' is being conducted in close cooperation with the Jacobs University Bremen and the Universities of Darmstadt and Duisburg-Essen. Anika Becher is the main researcher, Matthias Basedau is the supervisor of the 'Hamburg chapter' of the project.
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are the result of self-ascription or ascription by others but are usually inherited by birth and cannot easily be changed by an act of individual will. In order to avoid confusion with the narrower definition, which closely resembles 'tribe', we have decided to use only the generic term 'particularistic' for the aforementioned groups (cf. Almond and Coleman 1960; Bogaards 2007: 179) and related political parties, in the sense developed above.
Using the more abstract term 'particularistic party' does not mean, however, that we do not want to differentiate between the respective social bases of a possible ban. At this stage and
in light of what can be found in Africa in terms of implemented bans 2 it seems reasonable to distinguish parties on the basis of 1) ethnicity or tribe, 2) religion, 3) race, and 4) region under the umbrella of particularistic parties. 3
Moreover, these bans can take different forms with regard to the respective legal dimension of the ban. Provisions can differ in terms of whether or not they 'negatively' prohibit such particularistic parties or 'positively' proscribe specific requirements which are designed to ensure parties' non-particularistic nature. A 'positive' ban in this sense would be a requirement that a party is nationally represented in terms of party membership at the leader and/or the supporters' level. Ghana and Sierra Leone, for instance, proscribe that all parties have to maintain party branches and offices throughout the country (see Bogaards 2007: 182) .
The characteristics of particularistic party bans are not confined to the nature of particularism and the differentiation between 'positive' and 'negative' bans. Another pertinent differentiation refers to the nature of the legal sanction. The term 'ban' may include 1) the banning and dissolution of an already existing party; 2) a temporary ban, that is, suspension; or 3) the denial of registration to a group that wants to transform into a political party.
Moreover, it makes a difference whether the party bans are just a 'legal option' or whether a ban is actually executed or implemented. Each may have different effects (see discussion below). Given the limited number of countries without legal possibilities and the likely more measurable impact of actual implementation, we have decided to focus on the implementation of particularistic party bans.
Although this paper concentrates on implemented bans and only stresses the differences re- We limit the meaning of 'implementation' to any event in which a (would-be) political party is actually legally sanctioned with suspension, dissolution or denied registration. 'Enforcement' of party bans means that the provisions are observed. This may include an implemented party ban but not necessarily so, for instance, when no such (would-be) party emerges.
3
In order to capture the behavioural dimension of the ban ('acts on behalf of or in the interest of'), we assign respective party bans on, for instance, 'tribalism' to ethnic parties, 'racism' to racial parties, and 'regionalism' to regional parties. the regulated dimension of party politics (name, symbol, organization, membership, programme, campaigns, etc.) as well as the degree of 'restrictiveness': In a given setting parties may be easier to ban and opportunities and actual bans might extend to a larger number of identities and groups (see Table 1 ). 
How Particularistic Party Bans May Affect Conflict and Democracy
Given the culturally heterogeneous structure and the history of intercommunal conflict in many African countries (and elsewhere), the political, and particularly the partisan, organization of ethnic and other particularistic identities can be seen as generally undesirable (cf. Horowitz 1985; 1991; Salih 2003; McMahon 2004) . According to Bogaards (2007b: 5) , the politicization of ethnicity in Africa has been associated with ethnic conflict and ethnic violence;
human rights violations; repression -even genocide; political instability; democratic erosion; and the establishment of non-democratic regimes. But how does the politicization of ethnic and other particularistic identities produce such results? Basically, there are at least four transmission channels (Bogaards 2007b: 5-6 ):
First, in the case of an ethnic or cultural majority, (party) politics along cultural lines may lead to the marginalisation and exclusion of a cultural minority. As a consequence and second, such minorities may feel encouraged to resort to undemocratic or even violent means in order to counter this dominance. Third, irrespective of the relative size of particular identity groups, ethnic and other identity-based politics are likely to raise the stakes of the game, fanning emotions and reinforcing in-and out-group identities, thus increasing the likelihood of disturbances of public order. When religious divisions involve conflict over valueswhich can hardly be subject to compromise given their divine origin -the politicization of particularistic identities is particularly risky. Fourth, particularistic parties will probably entrench such societal divisions, keeping people apart instead of bringing them together. In sum, the politicization of particularistic identities makes intercommunal conflict and, as a result or independently, undemocratic politics more likely.
What can party bans do about these risks? From a functionalist perspective, the party system is the central intermediate structure between society and government (Sartori 1976: ix (Bogaards 2007: 181-182) . Moreover, the fact that dissolutions and suspensions of already existing and established parties will trigger more problems than the denial of registration cannot be excluded; in this respect the social basis of the (would-be) party concerned may also matter. Fifth, the nature of the regime and the party system might count. Positive effects are more probable when bans are executed in a democratic setting and a non-dominant party system because marginalisation and legitimacy problems are less likely. Finally, the constellation of the general surrounding conditions probably largely affects the magnitude of party-ban effects. Similar to the effects of institutions on democracy discussed by Dahl (1996) , party bans may be rather irrelevant if conditions such as socio-economic development, the general record of intercommunal relations, leadership features, control over forces of coercion, and external influences jointly point in a positive or negative direction. In less clear-cut constellations the party bans may matter.
Certainly, these considerations are far from being exhaustive. One conclusion, however, seems to be safe at this stage. How, to what extent, and in what direction party bans affect peace and democracy is far from being clear-cut. One can think of a multitude of diverging, sometimes contradictory hypotheses which are summarized in Table 2 . H 1.4 IPP bans have no effect on conflict but are an expression of past problems.
H 2.5 IPP bans have no effect on democratization but are an expression of authoritarianism. 
Empirical Strategy and Samples
Given the large number of hypotheses -and the many contextual conditions involved -we have to admit that not all hypotheses can be fully tested at this preliminary stage. Given that the project on 'ethnic party bans' is still a work in progress, there were a number of reasons not to employ more sophisticated quantitative and qualitative methods such as QCA or multivariate regressions. The compilation of our database has thus far resulted only in a fairly limited number of available cases, and some of the variables were on a nominal scale only (see below and Annex I).
Hence, a multivariate quantitative approach, in particular, does not seem suitable at this stage. Instead, we have embarked on a possibly less sophisticated comparative approach, which, however, has the advantage of keeping individual cases identifiable and will serve as a starting point for further testing.
Generally, a two-step approach was applied (see Table 3 ). As a first step we looked at the population of all implemented party bans (N = 22) between 1990 and 2006 ('Sample I'). Cases were coded as country years; any implementation of one (or more) particularistic party ban (s) is a case (e.g., Rwanda 2003 , Nigeria 1999 . Thus, if in one particular year more than one party was banned, it was nevertheless counted as one case. 7 We did not use formal cross-table statistics (that is Chi-Square Statistics) because the number of cases here is too low. In order to find out whether these cases are systematically connected to our dependent and intervening variables, we used simple macro-qualitative comparison in cross tables. For instance, if particularistic party bans positively affect the dynamics of peace and democracy, we must expect that in most of the cases we can find improvements in the two areas after the ban. This could be questioned, since there might be many differences with regard to several bans in one particular year and country. However, in almost all cases with various bans in one year, the official reason was identical. The only exception is Mauritania, which had a ban due to race and a denial of registration due to ethnicity in 2002 and, thus, is counted twice.
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In order to control for the differences with countries where no party bans were implemented, we had to apply a different sampling logic. We used a second sample ('Sample II') of all sub-Saharan countries which have the legal possibility to ban particularistic parties, 8 dichotomizing the independent variable in terms of whether or not one or more party bans were implemented. The exercise resulted in a sample of 41 countries. Similarly to what we did in the first step, we used simple macro-comparative cross tabs in this case, but the variance in the independent variable and the higher number of cases also allowed us to apply a bivariate analysis. If bans are effective, we expect 'ban countries' to perform better in dynamics of peace and democracy than 'non-ban countries'. Bivariate statistics should show a positive correlation between positive dynamics of peace/democracy and the implementation of bans. Controlling surrounding conditions allows for the testing of other possible determinants of peace and democracy.
Database and Sources
Even a preliminary study of the effects of party bans requires a fairly voluminous set of indicators. Though certainly far from being complete in terms of what can be conceptualized as theoretically important, the following paragraphs present an overview of the variables we have collected thus far. A detailed description of the data -particularly the scale levels, operationalizations, and sources -is available in Annex I.
The main problem in empirical research on the effects of party bans in Africa is certainly the almost complete lack of systematic descriptive data on the prevalence of and the exact nature of legal provisions and the actual implementation of party bans. Thus, one of the main tasks of the project has been the collection of systematic information on respective legal sources and actual events, resulting in a unique inventory on particularistic party bans. Data collection included a systematic assessment of all constitutions, party codes, and electoral laws which were in effect in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and late 2006. This resulted in an almost complete collection and examination of such sources (less than 5% missing).
However, the legal possibility of particularistic party bans served exclusively as a filter for the population of our second sample (see above). According to our research question, the independent variable is the actual implementation of party bans. Raising data for this variable proved difficult. In particular, it is a serious challenge to verify that a party ban was not implemented. In order to capture all such cases, we systematically examined pertinent sources such as various editions of the German language Afrika-Jahrbuch (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) reports. In addition, we conducted an expert survey of some 100 experts on the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa -from which approximately two thirds responded. As a result of this investigation we found out that particularistic party bans are more frequently implemented than originally assumed. Out of 41 countries which have the legal possibility of banning (particularistic) parties, 11 countries implemented altogether 71 of those bans. Moreover, we did not limit the data collection to counting the number of countries and targeted parties; we also identified the official legal reasons and the precise form of legal action. Altogether there were seven outright bans and two suspensions. In 62 cases would-be parties were denied registration. In 54 cases the reason was 'region', in 9 cases 'ethnicity', in 7 cases 'religion', and in one case 'race'.
In contrast to the case of the independent variable, for the dependent variable we could draw on already available data from sources usually employed in empirical studies. For conflict we used several sources and distinguished between the levels of conflict using two thresholds ('minor/latent' vs. 'major'): For major conflict (Conflict I) the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) data, with a 25-battle-death threshold per annum, as well as the database of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF) were used. In order to capture minor conflicts we consulted the Konfliktbarometer of the Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (HIIK), which also takes into account minor or latent conflict below the UCDP threshold. This resulted in a second dummy variable which includes minor and major conflicts (Conflict II). For democracy we relied on Freedom House (FH), although both dimensions of the FH ratings -political rights and civil liberties -were taken into account.
For both conflict and democracy variables we tried to capture the dynamic dimension of both phenomena by using not only information on absolute levels -for instance, in 1990 and 2007 -but also data from before and after the implementation of party bans, usually one year before and one year after.
In order to be able to control important context conditions, we also compiled data on four clusters of such conditions, more than 45 variables altogether. In almost all cases we drew on data from readily available sources (for details see Annex I) and tried to capture different points of time and dynamics. These clusters include the following (see also 
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-Data on political institutions, namely the electoral system, the party system, and the form of government. In this case we used sources such as Basedau (2007) and Hartmann (2007) but also compiled data from several websites ourselves. 
Analysis
According to our hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, particularistic party bans may have positive, negative, neutral or context-dependent effects on both conflict and democracy. In order to undertake a preliminary test of these hypotheses, we will embark on a two-step analysis of possible effects as outlined above in the empirical strategy. First, we will look at the sample of particularistic party bans, and second, we will use differences between 'ban countries' and 'non-ban countries' to determine whether we can detect theoretically plausible correlations with the dynamics of peace and democratization. Although contextual hypotheses are controlled for in some respects, we do not engage in a systematic test of their interaction with peace and conflict on the one hand and party bans on the other hand.
Sample I: Ban Cases Only
If particularistic party bans are a successful way to address conflict, we must expect that the level of conflict decreases after the implementation of a party ban. In turn, increased or unchanged levels of conflict support the hypotheses that bans have an adverse or no impact. As for our variables 'start' or 'end' of a major or minor conflict, the results point to rather neutral effects. Regardless of the level of conflict in terms of thresholds, the implementation of party bans is mostly related to 'no change'. 9 Out of 22 cases, 19 remained unchanged one year after the implementation of a party ban. A similar result is returned when we look at the intensities of conflict (as shown in Tables 5 and 6 ) -in this case only data for major conflict (i.e., above the 25-battle-death threshold) was available. Out of 21 cases (Namibia had to be coded as a missing case), 17 cases showed no change one year after party ban implementation.
9
Due to space constraints, results are not reported in tables. This is not to say that we conclude that party bans are indeed the major cause of the respective dynamics in these individual cases. Yet, it is also not likely that -in the whole setting of surrounding conditions -party bans did not play any role at all.
Looking at the specific types of party ban -if we want to conceptualize this as a context condition -does not point to spectacular relationships. With regard to the legal form of action, however, Table 5 illustrates that a denied registration (14 cases) is exclusively connected to no change in conflict intensities, whereas an outright ban (dissolution order) has more ambiguous 'effects'. Out of five cases, two show no change, another two positive dynamics, and one case negative dynamics. Suspension (two cases) is associated with either no change or more conflict. A similarly complex picture is derived from the analysis of the official reasons of bans (Table 6 ). Exclusively neutral are apparently bans on the grounds of 'race' and 'region' (or secessionism). This holds true roughly for 'religion', with just one case connected to more intense conflict after ban implementation and six cases which correspond to unchanged intensities. Ethnicity shows more divergent effects, with Burundi and Rwanda as opposed cases vis-à-vis conflict.
The absolute level of conflict before the implementation of the ban does not produce convincing results either. There might be a slight tendency that when there is no conflict any change is rather unlikely (just one change out of 16 cases). With already existing conflict (five cases), changes are likelier but point in different directions (two negative, two positive, one no change). 12 Although it is risky to draw conclusions at this point, one could argue that existing conflicts are more sensitive to the impact of party bans.
Similar to what we found for conflict, there is little evidence that points to a simple connection between the implementation of particularistic party bans and democratization. If we look at the changes of Freedom House values (average rating of 'political rights' and 'civil liberties') before and after bans, no clear-cut patterns emerge. However, implementation is less frequently associated with 'no change' than with conflict. Out of 22 cases, only five party bans are connected to stable ratings while six cases show negative and 11 show positive dynamics (see Table 7 ). This could be interpreted as evidence that democracy is more sensitive to the ef-
10
The second conflict variable -including minor conflicts -only shows a conflict start in Mauritania because Burundi is counted as being a conflict case since 1991.
11
Uganda must be seen as a special case, however, since party activity was not allowed under the Movement System of Museveni.
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fects of party bans. Given that 50% of the cases display improvements, we may also conclude that particularistic party bans are -at least in the short run -more likely to foster democratization than to hinder it. However, this may also be due to methodology in the narrow sense, because changes are more likely for Freedom House ratings, with its 1-7 scale, than the conflict scales, which run from 0 to 2 at best. In fact, changes are very small: Only in the cases of Nigeria (1998 ), Rwanda (1994 ), and Zambia (1993 does the change in the ratings exceed 0,5. (2002) Rwanda (1994) CAR (1995) Zambia (1993) Mauritania (2002) - 6 No Change Equatorial Guinea (1994) Mauritania (1991) -Namibia (2006) Tanzania (1992) Tanzania (2005) 5 Positive Burundi (1997) CAR (1998) Rwanda (2001) Rwanda (2003) Kenya (1992) Mauritania (2000) Mauritania (2004) Uganda ( or 'not free' -is examined, somewhat more interesting results are returned: The first finding shows that when a ban is implemented positive dynamics in terms of democracy are apparently more likely in 'not free' settings. Out of 14 'not free' cases, nine show positive and only two negative dynamics while in 'free' and 'partly free' regimes the outcomes are fairly evenly distributed. We should not overrate this finding, however. For non-free countries, the worst category in Freedom House, it may be easier to improve than for others. Yet, another result seems remarkable: Although this points rather to the causes of party bans -which is not the focus of this paper -only two out of 22 party bans were implemented in 'free' or democratic countries. Apparently, party bans are particularly popular in non-democratic settings (see Figure 1 ).
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Due to length constraints, detailed results are not reported. However, we find strong evidence that the prevalence of (violent) conflict and its continuation depends significantly on surrounding conditions. In particular, classical risk factors such as human development and income level in 1990, as well as major prior conflicts, are systematically connected to (ongoing) Conflict I (major conflicts only) and Conflict II (also including minor conflicts), with the signs pointing in the theoretically expected direction.
Lower levels of development and higher levels of prior conflict render conflict more likely.
Measures for the 'particularistic landscape' apparently affect major conflicts only. In addition to prior intrastate conflict (including latent conflicts), a larger Muslim population, a higher degree of ethnic or cultural fractionalization (according to Alesina et al. 2003 and Fearon 2003) , and the number of communal contenders -according to the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project -seem to have an impact on (ongoing) major conflict. Only the variables regarding the existence of a minority problem and the number of groups at risk (both according to MAR) show -somewhat weaker -significant relationships with both forms of conflict.
Variables regarding the political system produce fewer, but still some, significant correlations. There is some evidence that higher levels of behavioural -not ideological -polarization (that is, confrontation) in the party system are linked to conflict and its continuation. This is also true for the number of legislative multiparty elections (1990 to 2007) . This may be a proxy for stability or levels of democratization, and we also find some support for the assumption that more advanced democratization -here conceptualized as an intervening variable -renders peace and conflict resolution or termination more probable. Table 8 , the implementation of party bans is exclusively connected to positive developments. Yet, one should not overrate this finding: There are many countries without a party ban that show the same positive dynamics. And we should keep in mind that we could find negative dynamics in six cases when looking at periods directly related to the implementation and not the long period of 1990 to 2006, which partly coincided with the political opening up of sub-Saharan Africa. As well, the countries that implemented party bans were all rated 'not free' in 1990, except Namibia ('free') and Nigeria ('partly free'). Thus, the possibility of showing a negative dynamic was fairly small in comparison to the non-ban countries which showed higher levels of democracy in 1990. While there is apparently no strong nexus between party bans and democracy, surrounding conditions largely return the expected results: Democracy is less likely when there are longer conflicts and when these conflicts have not yet been terminated. However, the simple prevalence of major and minor conflict after 1990 is not connected to the level of democracy in 2006.
The classical risk factors for conflict also show significant relationships with democracy. The absence of prior conflict and higher human development levels in 1990, as well as higher growth rates before 1990, are significantly associated with higher levels of democracy.
Interestingly, none of the variables for the particularistic landscape show significant results.
Contrary to their effects on conflict, many political system variables affect the levels of democratization. In particular, less-dominant party systems and low levels of confrontation in the party system -polarization in the behavioural sense -are strongly and significantly linked to the success of democracy in 2006. In fact, polarization of the party system produces the strongest results of all variables (average polarization 1990-2001: 0,684 significant at the 1% level).
Another finding refers to the possibility of a party ban. It has already proven significant for the relationship with conflict. Though only significant at the 10% level, if party bans are legally possible, it is also likely that the country is less democratic in 2006.
Although we have not systematically tested the interaction of context conditions with democracy (or conflict), it should be mentioned that we indeed find that the prevalence of an implemented party ban is not independent from other context conditions. However, such variables can be seen as possible causes: We observe that party bans are typically implemented in countries which have presidential systems, were less democratic before 1990, and have a specific particularistic landscape. The variable 'any ban implemented' is positively and significantly linked to more Christians and less 'Animists' (i.e., adherents to African traditional religions) as well as a larger numbers of indigenous groups, communal contenders, and groups at risk. Remarkably, the degree of numerical ethnic polarization -that is the presence of relatively few groups -is negatively associated with the implementation of a party ban. Contrary to what would be expected, less-polarized countries are apparently more likely to ban particularistic parties.
Summary of Results
The results of our preliminary analysis can be summed up as follows: First, there is apparently no clear-cut and simple connection between the implementation of party bans on the one hand and conflict and democracy on the other. The hypotheses of strong positive and negative effects are not supported. Both the analysis of the bans and the comparison of ban and non-ban countries have not returned any significant relationship, possibly save the legal possibility of a party ban, which was not our independent variable. The only finding pointing to positive impacts may be that none of the countries which implemented a ban after Second, we find that conflict can be better explained by classical risk factors and variables describing the cultural constellation as well as some political system variables. Political system variables, particularly regarding the party system, and risk factors are strongly related to democracy.
Third, the strongest results as regards links to implemented party bans are produced when we look at variables which are possible causes of the implementation of party bans. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to look at the causes of party bans -implemented or not -a by-product of our analysis was the finding that the implementation of party bans is systematically connected to, among other things, presidentialism and features of the particularistic landscape. Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics, we have found that there is no simple connection between the implementation of party bans on the one hand and democracy and conflict on the other hand. Rather, context conditions seem of superior explanatory power. We have also found a systematic connection between party bans and variables that could be conceptualized as causes of their implementation.
Although the results have admittedly been somewhat disappointing thus far, it would be premature to conclude that the study of the effects of party bans is superfluous. We could detect at least some evidence that points to the context-dependent impact of such bans in individual cases. Given the preliminary stage of research, many questions remain unanswered. For instance, it seems possible that it is not the actual prohibition of a particular particularistic party that has strong effects but rather the legal possibility: If all relevant actors observe the provision, a pre-emptive -and invisible -impact may emerge without any party ban being necessary. Regarding implemented bans, the interaction of party bans with context conditions is probably the most promising area of future research in theoretical terms.
Thus, the main conclusion to be drawn refers to methodological challenges. First, future analyses have to take into account invisible pre-emptive effects arising from the mere legal possibility of party bans and find ways to measure them, for instance, by comparing countries with and without these possibilities. Second, the database should be extended both in terms of additional and modified indicators. For instance, a more advanced typology of particularistic party bans including characteristics such as 'positive' vs. 'negative' measures and the general degree of 'restrictiveness' may help in finding more convincing relationships.
Moreover, other measures of party regulation and specific measures to accommodate intercommunal relations, particularly specific features of electoral systems, should be integrated.
The application of different indicators of conflict and democracy is also recommended (e.g., various additional periods of time, other democracy measures, and the exact nature and intensity of inter-communal conflict).
Third, additional and more sophisticated macro-qualitative and macro-quantitative methods such as QCA or 'fuzzy sets' or multivariate regressions can be applied as soon as the database allows for it. Finally, we should not confine ourselves to methods aiming at generalization. Small-N and in-depth case studies -which may also look at changes over time -will probably be the most promising tool to control complex sets of conditions and to understand and explain what impact particularistic party bans may have in individual cases.
In any case, we should know more about the actual effects of a measure of party regulation whose normative compatibility with democracy remains uncertain. Indigenous: These are conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply distinct from those of dominant groups.
Annex I: List of Variables
Ethno-class: These are ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, most of whom occupy a distinct social and economic stratum or niche.
Communal Contenders: These are culturally distinct peoples, tribes, or clans in heterogenous societies who hold or seek a share in state power. Disadvantaged communal contenders are subject to some degree of political, economic, or cultural discrimination but lack offsetting advantages. Advantaged communal contenders are those with political advantages over other groups in their society. Dominant communal contenders are those with a preponderance of both political and economic power.
Religious Sects: These are communal groups that differ from others principally in their religious beliefs and related cultural practices, and whose political status and activities are centred on the defence of their beliefs.
National Minorities: These are segments of a trans-state people with a history of organized political autonomy whose kindred control an adjacent state but who now constitute a minority in the state in which they reside. 
